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OLD MACDONALD HAD A TRUST: HOW
MARKET CONSOLIDATION IN THE
AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY, SPURRED
ON BY A LACK OF ANTITRUST LAW
ENFORCEMENT, IS DESTROYING SMALL
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS
CODY MCCRACKEN
Farming is a profession of hope.
—Brian Brett
ABSTRACT
The U.S. agricultural industry is controlled by a handful of
large corporations. Unprecedented levels of market consolidation
has created a power disparity, where controlling corporations alone
shape markets, often to the disadvantage of small agricultural producers. A primary, and often overlooked, cause of this consolidationdriven bargaining disadvantage, and its resulting harm, can be
found in the lacking enforcement of the nation’s antitrust laws.
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learn from in my life. To Alden McCracken, Rodney Stam, and all the bygone
dirt farmers and stockmen, here’s to you, and the idea that we can once again
create a nation where the people who feed the world never have to worry about
feeding their own families. In loving memory of Virginia McCracken, the world’s
greatest grandmother.
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Faulty metrics and lax legal interpretations employed by regulatory agencies have permitted large corporations to grab control of
nearly every sector of the industry. From the seeds farmers plant
to the markets they sell their goods into; the American food chain
is one of the most consolidated areas of the entire economy. This
unfettered concentration has been disastrous for small producers,
increasing their costs and suppressing their profits, all while consumer costs continue to rise. Overall, this Note will present that a
lack of enforcement of antitrust laws is a leading contributor to
increased market consolidation of the agricultural industry, wreaking havoc on small producers, consumers, rural communities, and
as a result, the whole nation.
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INTRODUCTION
Wander out to the vast rural expanses that comprise a
majority of the nation’s geography,1 down any country road, and
you will bear witness to the monuments unintentionally erected
to mark the degradation of a way of life.2 A way of life that powered the birth and expansion of a nation and at one time was the
economic, cultural, and societal heart of the country.3 Across almost
any farm or ranch, there lay remnants of agricultural producers
past.4 A handful of abandoned homesteads, deteriorating homes
and barns, dotting each property.5 To most, these crumbling structures are no more than a quaint sign of how folks lived way back
when.6 Yet with a closer look, these homesteads turn into a flashing
warning sign, signaling the decades-long deterioration of rural
America.7 Say for example that a farm in eastern Montana has
four former homesteads across the entire property. This indicates
that at one time four separate families made a living off the same
land just one family makes their living on today.8 A casual observer may justifiably assume that producers today make four times
the profits and live four times better than producers did decades
ago. Yet there lies the issue: land that could at one time raise and

See New Census Data Show Differences Between Urban and Rural Populations, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom
/press-releases/2016/cb16-210.html [https://perma.cc/8WNW-B3CJ].
2 See Patricia Leigh Brown, Ghost Houses Reflect Fading of Farm Life, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/02/us/ghost-houses-re
flect-fading-of-farm-life.html [https://perma.cc/8V83-DQGP]; Kristin Scharkey,
Desert Homesteads Abandoned, Not Forgotten, DESERT SUN (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://kristinscharkey.com/blog/2016/10/28/high-desert-homesteads-are-aban
doned-but-not-forgotten [https://perma.cc/K5NQ-93HA].
3 See WILLARD WESLEY COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 7–9 (1993).
4 See Brown, supra note 2; Scharkey, supra note 2.
5 See Brown, supra note 2; Scharkey, supra note 2.
6 See Brown, supra note 2; Scharkey, supra note 2.
7 See Eduardo Porter, The Hard Truths of Trying to ‘Save’ the Rural Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12
/14/opinion/rural-america-trump-decline.html [https://perma.cc/4XUV-XRD7].
8 According to USDA data, the total number of farms in the United States
has been on a continued decline from its peak of 6.8 million farms in 1935, to
just over 2 million farms in 2019. The Number of U.S. Farms Continues to
Decline Slowly, USDA (May 10, 2021), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products
/chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=58268 [https://perma.cc/L58W-HAKN].
1
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support four or more families now can barely support one.9 Family
farmers and ranchers today are barely scraping by despite operating more land, producing more food, and doing so in a more
efficient and effective manner than the producers that operated
the same land before them.10
Agriculture has long been at the heart of this once primarily
agrarian nation.11 Still today, despite growing urbanization,12 agriculture is a central industry.13 With over 2 million farms and
ranches,14 operating nearly 900 million acres of land,15 agriculture’s impact extends far beyond the barnyard.16 Agriculture and
related industries contribute over 22 million jobs in the United
States, $1 trillion to gross domestic product (GDP)—a 5.4% share—
and the output of America’s farms and ranches contributed $132.8
billion to the economy.17 For small and large communities alike,
the success or failure of local producers dictates the success of local
businesses, industries, and schools, which dictates the survival of
all towns and in the long run, the survival of the nation’s economy.18
Despite agriculture’s critical role, those who comprise the
majority of agricultural production—small family producers—are
in economically dire straits.19 While today’s producers raise more

9 Alana Semuels, “They’re Trying to Wipe Us Off the Map.” Small American
Farmers Are Nearing Extinction, TIME (Nov. 27, 2019, 1:16 PM), https://time
.com/5736789/small-american-farmers-debt-crisis-extinction/ [https://perma.cc
/VA39-4MQS].
10 See id.; Evaggelos Vallianatos, America: Becoming a Land Without Farmers, INDEP. SCI. NEWS (Sept. 1, 2012), https://www.independentsciencenews
.org/environment/america-becoming-a-land-without-farmers/ [https://perma
.cc/RSJ2-MUZH].
11 See Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy, USDA (Dec. 16, 2020) [hereinafter Ag and Food Sectors], https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and
-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/ag-and-food-sectors-and-the-economy/
[https://perma.cc/CT2L-8WZL]; see also COCHRANE, supra note 3, at 3–4, 7–9.
12 U.S. DEP’T OF COM., UNITED STATES SUMMARY: 2010 POPULATION AND
HOUSING UNIT COUNTS 537 (Sept. 2012).
13 See Ag and Food Sectors, supra note 11.
14 USDA, FARMS AND LAND IN FARMS: 2020 SUMMARY 4 (Feb. 2021) [hereinafter FARMS AND LAND IN FARMS].
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See Ag and Food Sectors, supra note 11.
18 See id.
19 Around ninety percent of U.S. farms are small family operations. David
Domina & Robert Taylor, The Debilitating Effects of Concentration Markets
Affecting Agriculture, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. 62, 62–63 (2010); James McDonald
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produce more efficiently than ever,20 they have seen profit margins
degrade, all while consumers pay more for produce and large agricultural corporations make record profits.21 While the decline of
rural America and small producers may lend itself to several issues
(trade wars, climate change, technological advances, globalization,
etc.), there stands one that is the most immense and imminent
threat to small producers, their consumers, and the communities
they live in.22 This predominate threat is the pervasive market
consolidation currently controlling nearly all sectors of the agricultural industry.23
Building for decades, unfettered consolidation has resulted
in the U.S. agricultural economy being controlled by a handful of
large international corporations.24 From seed to storefront, every
facet of the market is dominated by a few corporations with concentration in many sectors reaching levels unmatched by any
point in history.25
This concentration puts market power in the hands of the
big and the few, allowing them to control terms squarely in line
with their interests.26 This has resulted in increased costs and decreased income for producers, which, mixed with rising retail
costs,27 prevents producers from receiving an appropriate and
necessary fraction of the retail food dollar.28 In the 1950s, when
a consumer purchased an agricultural product from the grocery
store, about forty-one cents of every dollar spent went to the
producer that grew it.29 That share remained consistent into the

& Robert Hoppe, Large Family Farms Continue to Dominate U.S. Agricultural
Production, USDA (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017
/march/large-family-farms-continue-to-dominate-us-agricultural-production/
[https://perma.cc/LSH9-T3UK].
20 See Semuels, supra note 9; Vallianatos, supra note 10.
21 Claire Kelloway, How to Close the Democrats’ Rural Gap, WASH. MONTHLY
(Mar. 2019), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january-february-march
-2019/how-to-close-the-democrats-rural-gap/ [https://perma.cc/27WR-QKG5].
22 Id.
23 Id.; see Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62, 74.
24 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62–63.
25 See id.; Rebecca Bratspies, Owning All the Seeds: Consolidation and Control in Agbiotech, 47 ENV’T L. 583, 584–85 (2017).
26 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 75.
27 See id. at 62, 74.
28 See id. at 64–65.
29 See id. at 64.
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1980s.30 Yet today, producers receive less than fifteen cents on
every dollar, even while raising the goods amounts to eighty percent of overall production costs, and consumer prices for goods
continue to rise.31 Where is the money going? Directly into the
coffers of the companies that control agricultural markets.32 This
decrease in profit share mirrors the dramatic rise of consolidation.33 Over the past few decades, as nearly every sector has seen
rapid and widespread consolidation growth, these same sectors
have increasingly produced adverse results for small producers.34
This has put producers in a vice, squeezing them from both the
input and output sides of their operations.35 Every phase of an
agriculture operation is made less profitable by consolidation.36
This is true for nearly all producers, no matter what they raise.37
While consolidation exists in many industries,38 no other is being
squeezed to such a degree as agriculture.39 As a result, small

See Kelloway, supra note 21.
Hannah Kass, Breaking Up Big Ag Requires Reasonable Antitrust Enforcement, REGUL. REV. (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/12/26
/kass-breaking-up-big-ag-antitrust-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/7UNU-ZYGN];
see Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 65.
32 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust: A New Direction for Agricultural Law, 75 N.D. L. REV. 449, 455 (1999); Domina & Taylor, supra note 19,
at 62.
36 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62, 74.
37 See id. at 74; Dean Zimmerli, Something Old, Something New: Relying
on The Traditional Agricultural Cooperative to Help Farmers Solve the Power
Imbalance in Modern Meatpacker Production Contracts, 24 S.J. AGRIC. L. REV.
59, 74 (2015).
38 While consolidation in technology sectors has recently drawn widespread ire,
everything from eyeglasses to freight shipping has concerning degrees of consolidation. See David Tsui et al., Regulators Lean in to U.S. Big Tech Firms, S&P
(Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/200825
-regulators-lean-in-to-u-s-big-tech-firms-11624217 [https://perma.cc/N5X2-QXX4];
David Lazarus, How Badly are we Being Ripped off on Eyewear? Former Industry
Execs Tell All, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com
/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-glasses-lenscrafters-luxottica-monopoly-20190305
-story.html [https://perma.cc/7CUV-U2XQ]; Jim Blaze, Railroad Mega-mergers:
To Be Feared, or a Path to Business Growth?, RY. AGE (June 9, 2020), https://
www.railwayage.com/freight/class-i/railroad-mega-mergers-to-be-feared-or-a
-path-to-business-growth/ [https://perma.cc/2QFP-5BZG].
39 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 455; Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 64.
30
31
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producers are worse off today than almost any point in American
history and are left begging for a cure to the consolidation dominating their livelihoods.40
While there does exist a legislative foundation to combat
consolidation and its anticompetitive effects—the Sherman Antitrust Act, Packers and Stockyard Act, and others—the mere existence of these laws has done little to dissuade this new wave of
consolidation.41 It is not a lack of legislation that is to fault.42
This unperturbed consolidation, while bolstered by several factors,
is brought on largely by a continual lack of enforcement of this
nation’s antitrust laws on the part of the government agencies
entrusted with their enforcement.43
While statutory gaps and changing judicial interpretations are often the focus of consolidation analysis, this Note will
instead analyze how a lack of antitrust enforcement, through the
implementation of lax agency interpretations and inaccurate metrics, has also helped pave the way for increased consolidation in
all sectors of the industry.44 This has been disastrous for small
producers, leading to increased costs,45 decreased profits, increased
bankruptcies, and other severely detrimental effects.46 Simultaneously this has failed to benefit consumers as retail produce costs
continuously rise.47 Overall, consumers are paying more while producers are making less, creating a pool of profits going entirely to
the large corporations that have concentrated market power.48
Part I of this Note will supply necessary background information, presenting the nation’s legislative regime that governs
modern market interactions.49 Part II presents the increased consolidation permeating all areas of the industry.50 Part III will introduce the principal argument of how, despite the existence of
the laws presented in Part I, they are not being effectively enforced

See Kelloway, supra note 21.
See Lauck, supra note 35, at 452–55.
42 See id. at 455.
43 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
44 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62.
45 See id. at 64–65, 74.
46 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
47 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 65, 74; Kelloway, supra note 21.
48 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62–65; Kelloway, supra note 21.
49 See infra Part I.
50 See infra Part II.
40
41
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which is a leading cause of consolidation.51 This Part will also
present possible solutions, and associated critiques.52 Part IV will
then show how the resulting consolidation has had a devastating
impact on small producers, consumers, and their communities.53
Finally, the Conclusion will reiterate these points and once again
warn that without increased antitrust law enforcement, there will
be no reduction in consolidation in the industry, extending its damaging effects on small producers, consumers, rural communities,
and the nation as a whole.54
I.BACKGROUND
Trusts, massive corporations that control large swaths of an
industry, have held a dominant presence in the American economy
for a majority of the nation’s existence.55 Agricultural producers
in particular have been battling trusts since their prominent emergence in the post–Civil War American economy.56 As the nation
grew and industrialized at a blistering pace, tycoons such as
Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Morgan, took advantage of the changing and unregulated world by grabbing complete control of critical
sectors of the new economy.57 These “robber barons” strong armed
their way into controlling the nation’s railroads, oil refineries, manufacturing plants, and more.58 No industry was saved from this
wave of monopolistic practices, chief among them agriculture.59 In
the late nineteenth century, the American Sugar Refining Company controlled eighty-five percent of the nation’s sugar refining,
while a group of Chicago meatpacking companies, known as the
“Big Five,” had a stranglehold on cattle markets.60 These are
only a few examples of the consolidation that controlled the industry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.61

See infra Part III.
52 See infra Part III.
53 See infra Part IV.
54 See infra Conclusion.
55 Lauck, supra note 35, at 450–51.
56 Id.
57 See id. at 450.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 450–51.
60 Id. at 450–54.
61 Id.
51
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In response to this market dominance and similar corporate
takeovers of economies around the world, a global movement grew
for economic reform.62 In Europe, this led to social and economic
upheavals; in some cases, culminating in complete economic regime
changes such as the Bolshevik revolution in modern day Russia.63
In the United States, this took shape in the Progressive
Movement, whose economic message revolved around increased
regulation and oversight of the large corporations dominating the
economy, including overhauls of antitrust laws.64 Small farmers
and ranchers were some of the most vocal advocates in this movement, pushing for legislation to remedy growing concentration
present throughout their industry.65 This push eventually resulted
in landmark pieces of legislation geared towards evening the playing field and protecting consumers.66 Most prominent of which
was the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.67 This monumental piece
of legislation broadly prohibited many of the anticompetitive practices that plagued the economy at the time such as anticompetitive agreements, price-fixing, and other unilateral conduct that
monopolized markets.68 The Act authorized the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to bring criminal or civil action against violators.69
However, one act alone could not cure the ills afflicting the
consolidated economy and antitrust remained a centerpiece of the
Progressive Movement into the twentieth century.70 In 1912, this
brought a strengthening of antitrust laws, including the Federal
Trade Commission Act.71 This established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to help enforce antitrust laws, and the new agency

See id. at 451.
See id.
64 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 451–53; Laurie Ristino, Back to the New:
Millennials and the Sustainable Food Movement, 15 VT. J. ENV’T L. 1, 5–6 (2013).
65 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 453–55.
66 Id. at 452–55.
67 See id. at 452.
68 See id. at 451–52; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7; see, e.g., Richter Concrete Corp. v.
Hilltop Basic Res., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 893, 917 (S.D. Ohio 1981). The purpose of
the Act was not to protect competitors from harm from legitimately successful
businesses, but to preserve a competitive marketplace to protect consumers from
abuse. KATALIN JUDIT CSERES, COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
291–93 (2005).
69 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
70 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 452.
71 See id.
62
63
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immediately undertook large-scale investigations of consolidated
agricultural sectors.72 Enacted the same year, the Clayton Act
attempted to further curb concentration by limiting corporate
mergers and increasing farmer bargaining power by exempting
agricultural co-operatives from certain regulations.73 Clayton additionally authorized private parties injured by prohibited anticompetitive conduct to bring suits for remedies such as treble damages.74
Another critical piece of legislation that specifically targeted
consolidation in the meatpacking sector is the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA).75 Congress passed the PSA in response to a 1919
FTC investigation which found concentration and unfair monopolistic activities by the “Big Five” meatpacking companies.76 The
PSA further prohibited meat packers from engaging in the use
of unfair, anticompetitive, or deceptive practices.77 The language
of the PSA makes clear that courts should give particularly close
scrutiny to the marketing problems of agricultural producers.78
Despite this seemingly strong statutory footwork from which
consolidation and its effects can be combatted, these efforts would
not fully deliver the reforms producers had hoped.79 While doing
a great service at reducing consolidation and creating relatively
fair markets for much of the 20th century, by the end of the century changing interpretations and enforcement practices would
allow trusts to reemerge and retake control of agricultural markets.80 Producers dedicated decades of resources and political capital
See id. at 452–53.
See Lauck, supra note 35, at 452–53; Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 87.
74 15 U.S.C. § 15. Treble damages allow the plaintiff to pursue three times
as much money in damages as the violation cost them. Id. While private parties
are an often efficient body to bring antitrust claims, they are constrained to
private remedies and cannot effectively regulate markets on their own. See Lauck,
supra note 35, at 453–56. Active government regulation is necessary and is
the focus of this Note.
75 See Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 74–75.
76 See id.
77 7 U.S.C.A. § 192(a), (g) (West 2005); see Lauck, supra note 35, at 489;
Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 79–80. High levels of concentration are
not per se violations of the PSA. Yet, high concentration levels indicate a high
level of market power in a few firms and establishes that monitoring for anticompetitive behavior is warranted. See Lauck, supra note 35, at 489.
78 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 489–90. Courts have generally done so, if
given the chance. Id.
79 See id. at 454–56.
80 See id. at 455; Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62.
72
73
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pushing for increased regulation of trusts, understanding the risks
consolidation meant for their pocketbooks, communities, and way
of life.81 Despite the legislative actions their perpetual push accomplished, many of the ills producers suffered in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century are once again being felt by
those of the 21st century, if not in greater levels.82 Foremost among
these is the market consolidation, once triumphed upon, that has
once again grown to retake control of American agriculture.83
Today, market consolidation dominates nearly every sector of the agribusiness industry at levels parallel to, and in some
sectors exceeding, those of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the progressive antitrust movement and the
resulting legislation laid out above first came to form.84
II.MODERN MARKET CONSOLIDATION
Agricultural production itself is one of the least concentrated
areas of the entire economy.85 Tens of thousands of farmers and
ranchers operate mostly their own land with their own equipment
to grow their own produce, which eventually finds its way into the
homes and businesses of consumers around the world.86 However,
the market’s producers rely on to grow and sell their goods are,
in contrast, some of the most concentrated.87 This puts producers
in a bind as the inputs necessary for production must be obtained
from oligopolistic suppliers, while their raw commodities must be
sold in highly concentrated supply chains.88 From the moment a
producer purchases seeds and rides out on their tractor to plant
them into the soil, to when they sell their produce to the grain bins,

See Lauck, supra note 35, at 450–53.
See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62–64.
83 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 454–55; Domina & Taylor, supra note 19,
at 62–64.
84 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 450–55; Domina & Taylor, supra note 19,
at 62.
85 Diana L. Moss & C. Robert Taylor, Short Ends of the Stick: The Plight of
Growers and Consumers in Concentrated Agricultural Supply Chains, 2014
WIS. L. REV. 337, 348–49 (2014).
86 FARMS AND LAND IN FARM, supra note 14, at 4; Ag and Food Sectors, supra note 11.
87 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62–63.
88 Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 348–49; see Domina & Taylor, supra
note 19, at 74.
81
82
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stockyards, or other sale points; every product needed for each
step of this process is dominated by a few massive firms.89 This
consolidation has not just reemerged over the past few decades,
it has increasingly reached record highs.90
A. Input Side Consolidation
Starting with concentration in the input markets where
producers purchase the materials necessary to grow their produce.91
Seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, farm equipment, and nearly every
sector is plagued by consolidations.92
1. Seeds, Fertilizers, Pesticides
The levels of global concentration are highest in crop seeds,
fertilizers, and pesticides.93
Until fairly recently, seeds were considered a common resource with thousands of small companies operating in the sector.94
To reduce costs, farmers commonly employed practices such as
saving seeds from past harvests to reuse in future plantings.95
However, a few key legal changes marked the end of this era and
set the stage for consolidation.96 In 1980, the Supreme Court began
allowing patenting of genetically engineered organisms.97 A few
years later, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office extended intellectual property rights to plant varieties, giving patent holders
the ability to curtail practices like saving seeds.98 These developments unleashed a flood of new genetically engineered patented

See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 348–49; Domina & Taylor, supra
note 19, at 74.
90 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 348–49; Domina & Taylor, supra
note 19, at 62–63.
91 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 341–42.
92 See id.; Bratspies, supra note 25, at 584.
93 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 341–42.
94 Bratspies, supra note 25, at 589.
95 See id.
96 Id.
97 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310–11 (1980); see Bratspies, supra
note 25, at 589–91.
98 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 589–90.
89
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seeds.99 Within a decade, fifty-two percent of corn, seventy-nine
percent of cotton, and eighty-seven percent of soybean acreage in
the United States was planted with patented seeds.100 This allowed the handful of large corporations that held these patents
to use this power to grab control of the sector, which along with
a lack of antitrust enforcement quickly drove small suppliers out
of business and led to increased consolidation.101
Seed markets today are now some of the least competitive.102
In 1994, the top four seed companies controlled twenty-one percent
of the global market.103 By 2013, the top three controlled fiftyfive percent.104 Today, four firms own eighty-four percent of total
market share.105 In the United States, the share of seed sales controlled by these firms are ninety-one percent for cotton,106 eightyfive percent for corn,107 and seventy-six percent for soybeans.108
Since these same companies also control the markets for
fertilizers and pesticides, similar concentration is present.109
Between 1994 and 2009, four-firm concentration for agricultural
chemicals increased by eighty-seven percent, from twenty-eight
percent to fifty-three percent.110 The markets for potash and phosphate fertilizers are tight oligopolies, with three firms accounting
for the bulk of North American output.111 The top four producers
of nitrogen fertilizer controlled thirty-four percent of the market
in 1977, but by 2015 their share had increased to more than
sixty-seven percent.112

Id.
100 Id. at 589.
101 See id. at 584, 590–92.
102 Id. at 588.
103 KEITH O. FUGLIE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC RESEARCH REPORT
NO. 130: RESEARCH INVESTMENTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE IN THE FOOD PROCESSING, AGRICULTURAL INPUT, AND BIOFUEL INDUSTRIES WORLDWIDE 14 (2011).
104 Kelloway, supra note 21; see Bratspies, supra note 25, at 584.
105 See Kelloway, supra note 21; Kass, supra note 31.
106 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 587–88.
107 Kass, supra note 31.
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109 Id.
110 Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 341–42.
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112 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 587–88.
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2. Farm Implements
Raising produce requires not only seeds, but also the large
and technologically advanced equipment needed to plant, control,
and harvest the produce.113
Today two companies, John Deere and CNH Industrial, hold
the lion’s share of manufacturing and sales of agricultural equipment.114 In the mid-1900s, Deere’s market share stood at 14.5%.115
Today, Deere holds fifty-three percent of large farm tractors, followed by CNH at thirty-five percent.116 Deere’s lead is even more
commanding in the combine segment, controlling sixty percent
of the market, followed by CNH at thirty percent.117
While stark, one must consider an argument often used to
justify this sector-specific consolidation. As the number of farms
decreased and farmers were forced to operate more land, that decreased the number of implements sold.118 Less farmers, less equipment, forcing smaller implement dealers out of business while
the large must get larger to survive.119 Nevertheless, this does
not fully rationalize the need for so little competition.120 Also, as
seen later, consolidation in the implement sector is causing massive
damage, despite controlling companies finding a more sympathetic
rationale to justify their dominance.121
Overall, before a producer gets anywhere near realizing an
income, they are already squeezed by a handful of corporations who

113 See Jennifer Reibel, Manufacturer Consolidation Reshaping the Farm
Equipment Marketplace, FARM EQUIP. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.farm-equip
ment.com/articles/15962-manufacturer-consolidation-reshaping-the-farm-equip
ment-marketplace [https://perma.cc/U2S3-7MH3].
114 Candice Y. Riviere et al., Competition Concerns and Proposed Remedies
for Agriculture Labor, Seeds, Farm Equipment, and Meat and Dairy Processor
Consolidation (Yale U. Thurman Arnold Project), Feb. 2021, at 20.
115 Reibel, supra note 113.
116 Thomas J. Horton & Dylan Kirchmeier, John Deere’s Attempted Monopolization of Equipment Repair, and the Digital Agricultural Data Market—Who Will
Stand Up for American Farmers? (2020 CPI Antitrust Chron.), Jan. 2020, at 2.
117 Id.
118 See Reibel, supra note 113.
119 Id. This argument cannot be applied to other sectors, because while there
may be fewer overall producers, they are still producing as much, if not more,
goods than ever and require the same supply of input goods to do so.
120 See infra Part IV.
121 See Riviere et al., supra note 114, at 20; infra Part IV.
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control how they purchase their seeds, equipment, and nearly every
other sector of the input stage.122
B. Output Side Consolidation
Consolidation examples are just as egregious on the output side.123 When a producer sells their produce, they will again
face a gauntlet of consolidated buyers shaping prices adverse for
producers.124
1. Livestock
Some of the most shocking examples of consolidation come in
the purchasing and processing of livestock produced by American
ranchers (cattle, pigs, poultry, etc.).125
As discussed earlier, the dominance of the “Big Five” Chicago
meat packers, who controlled roughly eighty percent of the cattle
meatpacking industry in the early 1900s, was a driving force behind the push for aggressive antitrust laws and enforcement.126
Following the passage of the PSA and other legislation, consolidation in the industry was alleviated for much of the remaining
century.127 In the 1970s, when consolidation was at its lowest,128
the four largest meat packers slaughtered only about twenty-five
percent of cattle.129 Yet, over the intervening decades consolidation
once again swept the industry and today four companies control
eighty-five percent of the market.130 The “Big Five” meat packers

See Lauck, supra note 35, at 455; Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 64.
123 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62, 79–80.
124 See id.
125 See Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 63–64.
126 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 455.
127 See Homegrown Stories: Gilles Stockton—Exposing Corporate Power in the
Cattle Industry, FARM AID (Jan. 15, 2020) [hereinafter Homegrown Stories: Gilles
Stockton], https://www.farmaid.org/blog/homegrown-stories-gilles-stockton-ex
posing-corporate-power-cattle-industry/ [https://perma.cc/FX2Z-R2YX]; Zimmerli,
supra note 37, at 61–63. In 1921, resulting from the PSA, a consent-decree was
implemented, requiring the large controlling packers to divest themselves of
their market centers, stockyards, and monopoly of transportation. See Homegrown Stories: Gilles Stockton, supra note 127.
128 See Homegrown Stories: Gilles Stockton, supra note 127.
129 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
130 See id.
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of the early 1900s have now been supplanted by the big four, who
control an even larger share of the industry.131
This dominance is present in all livestock industries.132 The
top four pork processors process eighty percent of the nation’s hogs
and control sixty-sex percent of the market, up from thirty-seven
percent in 1987.133 In poultry, over sixty percent of the market is
controlled by only four corporations, nearly doubling their market
share since the 1970s.134 These industries are also home to high
levels of vertical integration, further expanding market control.135
From cows to chickens, livestock processing is home to some of
the most consolidated markets in the entire economy, and with
it comes some of the most detrimental effects.136
2. Crop Processing
In the processing of grains, soybeans, and other crops,
consolidation—while not as drastic as in livestock—is dominant
and increasing.137 In the milling of wheat flour, three firms account
for over fifty percent of the market.138 In soybeans, four companies process about eighty-five percent of the market, up from sixtyone percent thirty years ago.139 For corn milling, the nation’s most
produced crop,140 eighty percent of sales were attributed to the
four largest firms.141
These consolidation metrics and their rates of increase are
jarring.142 Nearly every sector with which a producer interacts is

See Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 63.
See id. at 62.
133 See CLAIRE KELLOWAY & SARAH MILLER, OPEN MKTS. INST., FOOD AND
POWER: ADDRESSING MONOPOLIZATION IN AMERICA’S FOOD SYSTEM 4 (2019).
134 Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 63–64.
135 “Vertical integration” is the process whereby a company owns and controls nearly every stage of production. See id.
136 See id. at 61–64.
137 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 343.
138 Id.
139 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
140 Tom Capehart & Susan Proper, Corn is America’s Largest Crop in 2019,
USDA (Aug. 01, 2019).
141 Matthew Elliott, Grain Merchant and Processor Consolidation, Concentration, and Competition, SDSU EXTENSION (Dec. 19, 2018).
142 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 64–65.
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dominated by a few corporations.143 However, these statistics do
not tell the half of it. Several other factors must be considered to
get the full picture of modern-day consolidation in the agricultural industry.144
C. Additional Factors
These high levels of consolidation, while shocking, are exacerbated by a litany of factors, such as location.145 Just because
there is more than one provider or processor operating in the
entire nation, does not mean every producer has access to more
than one.146 At the local level, producers may be limited to a single
option for their input and output needs, giving already dominant
businesses complete monopolies and leaving producers nowhere
to go if treated unfairly.147 This is worsened by the fact that many
rural areas still lack access to reliable broadband internet access,
cutting them off from global markets that could partially alleviate the burden of the more highly concentrated markets in their
immediate areas.148
Equally troubling is the growing concentration in the retail segment, with eight firms controlling about fifty percent of
the market.149 Again, in regional markets, this concentration can
often be even higher.150 Growing concentration in the midstream
and downstream segments of the supply chain exacerbates a lack
of competition and bargaining power and its damaging effects.151
It is evident that consolidation in nearly every sector of
agriculture is at levels unmatched from a historical perspective.152
The controlling trusts of the early 1900s, whose market dominance
spurred the creation of antitrust laws, have been supplanted by
even more consolidated groups of companies that control a greater

See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 343; Domina & Taylor, supra note
19, at 62–64.
144 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 352.
145 See id.
146 See id.; Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 66–68.
147 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 352–53; Kelloway, supra note 21.
148 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 352–53; Kelloway, supra note 21.
149 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 344.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62–64.
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share of the markets than their Gilded Age predecessors.153 The
consolidation that has a stranglehold on the industry today does
not merely match consolidation witnessed over a century ago but
greatly eclipses it.154
This creates real concerns about the effects these mergers
have on producers and consumers.155 Among these concerns are
the possibility of price increases and loss of choice, both for producers and consumers, leading to decreased profits for producers,
which may have widespread effects on the nation.156 As shown in
Part IV, these concerns are very much being realized.157
What has led to this dramatic market domination? Part III
will lay out the principal argument that, despite the statutory
foundation for antitrust regulation, a lack of enforcement of these
laws has allowed a handful of corporations to swallow up entire
sectors of the industry.158 Without remedy, the consolidation presented in this Part may grow even larger.159
III.CAUSE OF CONSOLIDATION & SOLUTIONS
In witness of the legislative accomplishments the antitrust
movement delivered,160 it begs the question how the current level
of consolidation has occurred.161 How, even after the enactment
of many laws focused on combating anticompetitive conduct, can
market consolidation have worsened to the historical high where
it stands today?162 For decades these laws successfully alleviated
consolidation in not just agriculture, but in most industries.163
Overwhelming evidence indicates that this sudden failure to stop
the unmitigated growth of consolidation can lend itself primarily
to a change in policy—specifically, changes in implementation,

See Lauck, supra note 35, at 452–53.
154 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62–64.
155 Id. at 64–65.
156 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 599.
157 See infra Part IV.
158 See supra Part I; Lauck, supra note 35, at 497–98.
159 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 64.
160 Supra Part I.
161 Supra Part II.
162 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
163 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 497–98.
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interpretation, and a drastic lack of enforcement of the nation’s
antitrust laws.164
Changes in judicial interpretations are often derided, and
rightfully so, as a leading cause of lacking enforcement.165 However, judicial interpretations are not alone in blame. Over the past
few decades, the federal government has pulled the antitrust cops
off the beat.166 Regulators have permitted massive agribusinesses
to merge and consolidate markets unchecked, despite the fact that
laws were created explicitly to combat their anticompetitive behavior.167 This often non-existent enforcement by federal agencies has exacerbated disparity in market power, allowing abusive
treatment of producers to flourish and corporations to transform
food systems.168 How this has been permitted to continue comes
down to how agencies such as the FTC and the DOJ have employed lax metrics and interpretations of antitrust statutes.169
In line with judicial changes, institutional interpretations
of antitrust laws have become narrowly focused not on competition but on economic efficiency.170 Mergers and various forms of
exclusionary conduct are generally evaluated in the context of
static effects on consumer surplus or total economic surplus.171
The focus is therefore on anticompetitive output restrictions and
supra-competitive prices as well as any cost-lowering effects of, or
consumer benefits from, mergers or certain business practices.172
Little else is typically considered.173 This efficiency-focused analysis
has been used by corporations and regulators to justify many of
the mergers that have led to increased consolidation.174

See Kelloway, supra note 21.
See Lauck, supra note 35, at 450.
166 FOOD & WATER WATCH, WHY ANTITRUST LAWS MATTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD 1 (Mar. 2010); see Homegrown Stories: Gilles Stockton, supra
note 127.
167 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 358–59.
168 See Kelloway, supra note 21; Kass, supra note 31; Moss & Taylor, supra
note 85, at 339.
169 See Kelloway, supra note 21; Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 358–59.
170 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 358–59; Bratspies, supra note 25,
at 608; Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 65–67.
171 Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 358.
172 Id. at 358–59.
173 Id. at 359.
174 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 585–86.
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This narrow focus on price and output may be adequate in
the context of some industries.175 But in agriculture, these analytics are insufficient and neglect to consider the abuses to which
small producers are currently subjected.176 These calculations also
fail to include critical policy objectives such as produce quality,
health and safety, stability of food chains, and environmental
sustainability.177 Consolidation has a detrimental impact on all
these efforts, yet modern calculations fail to even consider them.178
For example, supply chain fragility is a greater threat in sectors
with high consolidation.179 Supply chains featuring few competitors
and high entry barriers are excessively exposed to the risk of disruption and collapse following any type of exogenous shock.180 This
was showcased in 2020 when, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, a series of meatpacking facilities across the nation became
infected, forcing them to cease operations.181 While this hit a relatively small number of facilities,182 due to massive consolidation
in the sector,183 a containable outbreak evolved into a major threat

Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 359.
176 Id.
177 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 607–09; Moss & Taylor, supra note 85,
at 359.
178 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 357–59.
179 Id.
180 Id. (“Shocks can range from input-market disruptions, to political events,
weather, and quality control problems.”).
181 See Michael Grabell & Bernice Yeung, Meatpacking Companies Dismissed
Years of Warnings but Now Say Nobody Could Have Prepared for COVID-19,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 20, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/meat
packing-companies-dismissed-years-of-warnings-but-now-say-nobody-could-have
-prepared-for-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/N3QR-5QVS]; see also Michael Grabell
& Bernice Yeung, Emails Show the Meatpacking Industry Drafted an Executive
Order to Keep Plants Open, PROPUBLICA (Sep. 14, 2020, 2:43 PM), https://
www.propublica.org/article/emails-show-the-meatpacking-industry-drafted-an
-executive-order-to-keep-plants-open [https://perma.cc/HF3K-BN8T].
182 More than 100 meat processing plants have had COVID-19 outbreaks.
Jacey Fortin, After Meat Workers Die of Covid-19, Families Fight for Compensation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/business
/coronavirus-meatpacking-plants-compensation.html [https://perma.cc/X2WM
-X27A]. There are over 7,000 meat and poultry processing plants in the United
States, however a handful do a majority of the processing. See The United States
Meat Industry at a Glance, NAMI, https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht=d
/sp/i/47465/pid/47465 [https://perma.cc/WRP9-NNPE].
183 See Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 62–63. In the cattle industry, a little
more than fifty plants are responsible for as much as ninety-eight percent of
175
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to the entire American food chain.184 When a single meatpacking
plant in Sioux Falls, South Dakota processes five percent of all
pork, a single closure causes widespread disruption.185 This sent
the livestock industry spiraling; spiking retail meat prices,186 putting plant workers in the middle of pandemic hotspots,187 and
leaving ranchers stuck with no place to sell their livestock, forcing some to euthanize animals.188 Further, even while meat prices
spiked for consumers, prices for producers dropped.189 While this

slaughtering and processing in the United States. Michael Corkery & David
Yaffe-Bellany, The Food Chain’s Weakest Link: Slaughterhouses, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 18, 2020). Bad hygiene practices and crowded working places also led
these facilities to be particularly hard hit by viruses. See Polly Mosendz et al.,
U.S. Meat Plants Are Deadly as Ever, With No Incentive to Change, BLOOMBERG
(June 18, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-06-18/how-meat
-plants-were-allowed-to-become-coronavirus-hot-spots [https://perma.cc/BA8E
-A2ZQ].
184 See Grabell & Yeung, supra note 181.
185 Michael Pollan, The Efficiency Curse, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/02/05/pandemic-food-resilience/ [https://
perma.cc/8PLE-UXHN].
186 John Waggoner, Why the Coronavirus Outbreak Has Sent Food Prices
Soaring, AARP (July 24, 2020), https://www.aarp.org/money/budgeting-saving
/info-2020/food-prices-coronavirus-outbreak.html [https://perma.cc/AM3Y-TQKV];
Kate Taylor, Meat Costs are Soaring During the Pandemic, Skyrocketing in
Grocery Stores and on Restaurant Menus, BUS. INSIDER (June 9, 2020, 1:42 PM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/meat-prices-rise-in-grocery-stores
-and-restaurants-2020-6 [https://perma.cc/8PLE-8RF9].
187 Over 50,000 meat plant workers have been infected by the COVID-19
virus, killing over 200. Kimberly Kindy, More Than 200 Meat Plant Workers in
the U.S. Have Died of Covid-19. Federal Regulators Just Issued Two Modest Fines,
WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/osha
-covid-meat-plant-fines/2020/09/13/1dca3e14-f395-11ea-bc45-e5d48ab44b9f
_story.html [https://perma.cc/7A45-FC7V]; Leah Douglas, Mapping Covid-19
Outbreaks in the Food System, FOOD & ENV’T REPORTING NETWORK (Apr. 22,
2020), https://thefern.org/2020/04/mapping-covid-19-in-meat-and-food-proces
sing-plants/ [https://perma.cc/3D5Q-N5LH].
188 See Jade Scipioni, Fourth Generation Cattle Rancher: ‘It’s Just Become
a Survival Game’, CNBC (May 15, 2020, 10:12 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020
/05/15/fourth-generation-cattle-rancher-its-just-become-a-survival-game.html
[https://perma.cc/UP7E-D46G]. A few decades ago, if this same event were to occur, ranchers could take their livestock to the thousands of local meat plants that
existed at the time. See, e.g., Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 62. However corporate control drove many of those small packers out of business. Id. at 62–63.
189 Cattle prices dropped thirty percent to forty percent since the start of
COVID-19 shutdowns in March 2020 to May 2020. Dan Nosowitz, Why Are Beef
Prices and Demand Up, But Cattle Prices Down?, MOD. FARMER (Apr. 9, 2020),
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was a clear threat to the American food system, modern interpretations do not incorporate the potential for such an event into
their calculations.190
Further, the specific metrics employed by regulators fail to
incorporate factors unique to agriculture.191 A primary example is
a major U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report which
regulating agencies have heavily adopted into their analyses.192
This report greatly understates consolidation in agriculture by not
considering important factors, such as the perishability of certain
commodities that geographically restricts where they can feasibly
be transported or sold.193 The GAO overlooked the fact that perishability in captive draw areas means that producers in some
regions have only one or two buyers, creating no real competition
in their areas.194 As stated earlier, due to many factors, concentration may be worse in some regions.195 If the GAO would have
considered this, it would have more than doubled the consolidation statistics upon which industry regulators rely.196

https://modernfarmer.com/2020/04/why-are-beef-prices-and-demand-up-but-cat
tle-prices-down/ [https://perma.cc/EQA8-4T4E]. In the same time span, the National Grocers Association found sales were up ninety-one percent and ground
beef sales alone were up $180 million from the same time in 2019. Id. This has
caused some to suspect price-fixing. Id.; Pandemic Results in Record Farm-toRetail Price Spreads in Beef and Pork, FARM BUREAU (Sept. 4, 2020), https://
www.fb.org/market-intel/pandemic-results-in-record-farm-to-retail-price-spreads
-in-beef-and-pork [https://perma.cc/D3H5-FLCH].
190 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 587–88. Antitrust analysis has focused
primarily on attaining efficiency, which entails the relentless reduction of redundancy. See id. at 585. This has direct implications for consolidation in agricultural supply chains. See id. at 591. In determining whether a merger is likely
to substantially lessen competition, antitrust enforcers may not consider its
effect on exacerbating the fragility of a supply chain by eliminating the number
and diversity of suppliers. Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 359; see Bratspies,
supra note 25, at 587–89.
191 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 338.
192 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 65–66.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 65–67.
195 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 352.
196 See id. The GAO reported a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) value of
over 2,000. Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 65. However, this is in the broad
sellers’ market. Id. If the GAO had considered perishability, HHI on the buyer
side of the market would have exceeded 5,000, greatly altering the analysis for
regulators. Id. at 66.
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The motives behind these lax interpretations and misaligned
metrics cannot be fully known.197 However, the complex impact
of market power in agriculture is revealed in a number of ways,
including noncompetitive prices, price discrimination, control of
market entry, and control of innovation.198 The economic power
in agriculture has also translated to the use of intimidation, capture
of regulatory agencies, and often successful attempts to influence
legislation regulating agricultural trusts.199 Large agribusinesses
and agribusiness organizations wield considerable political power.200
This influence has been used to change the rules of the game and
obtain legislation and regulations that favor the big and powerful over smaller independent producers and consumers.201 This
further increases their profits, leading to more political capital,
promulgating a cycle of influence that silences the concerns of
average producers and consumers.202
While the cause and true motive behind this laissez faire
approach is not clear, it is apparent it has allowed large corporations to grow and grab mightier shares of the industry with little
push back from the regulators tasked with preventing such consolidation and harm.203 Thankfully, there are a number of potential solutions that have been presented to retool interpretations and
get regulators back to regulating and reducing the rampant consolidation completely controlling, and in many ways harming,
the industry.204
A. Solutions
The clearest solution is for regulatory agencies to use their
interpretation and execution discretion to take a more aggressive
approach in fighting consolidation in agriculture.205 Some suggest mergers should be halted absent a “clear showing” that the

See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 356.
198 See id. at 359; Bratspies, supra note 25, at 604–06.
199 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 359.
200 Id.
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 See id. at 356–59.
204 See id. at 365–66.
205 See Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 74–76.
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merger is necessary to achieve a demonstrable gain in efficiency.206
Others suggest regulators must consider additional anticompetitive factors when evaluating mergers in the industry, such as effects
on producers, rather than simply looking at the artificial “efficiency” standards highlighted earlier.207 While varied, these suggestions are all meaningful encapsulations of what must be adjusted
in order to combat consolidation.208 Overall, along with increased
focus on agricultural trusts, regulators must employ analytical
changes such as implementing more applicable metrics and considering the unique aspects of producing agricultural goods.209
A good place to start is to look at the analytics regulators
employ to observe and understand consolidation.210 As stated earlier, the measures upon which enforcement agencies rely fail to
consider important metrics to truly present the concentration
producers face, such as how concentration is often worse on local
levels.211 Statistics must be developed for these captive draw areas,
reflecting time and distance constraints for marketing commodities, as well as the litany of other analytics unique to agriculture
expressed above.212 Employing arcane calculations of concentration causes regulators to lose sight of what should be the guiding
question: whether a handful of corporations should be allowed to
control global markets, often to the detriment of a majority of producers and consumers.213
A fundamental review of metrics used to study concentration, particularly in agricultural markets, is necessary.214 Yet,

See id. at 75.
See id.; Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 358–59; Bratspies, supra note
25, at 587–88, 608.
208 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 74.
209 See id.
210 See id. at 65–68.
211 See id. at 65.
212 Id.
213 Bratspies, supra note 25, at 587–88.
214 Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 66. University of Wisconsin Antitrust
Law Professor Peter Carstensen has called for new metrics to assess buyer power:
Enforcers need to develop a deeper understanding of the unique
characteristics of the buying side of the marketplace. This calls for
appropriate metrics. A mindless transposition of seller side criteria for market shares or competitive effects can result in a deeply
flawed analysis of the buyer power implications of mergers.
Id. at 66–67.
206
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evolved analytics is just one solution to the failing interpretations
instituted by regulators.215 Governmental agencies must also recognize complex and unique characteristics of each individual sector
and resist employing one size fit all approaches.216 For example,
the way market power manifests in the poultry sector is considerably different than in the beef sector.217 Therefore, a single metric
or approach to competition analysis will be inadequate and fail
many producers.218
Additionally, as mentioned earlier, the fragility of food
chains, as showcased by separate meatpacking facility shutdowns
caused by COVID and cyber-attacks, is a prevalent threat, yet
for the most part is not considered by regulators.219 Regulators
must consider food chain stability, environmental effects, and other
critical factors consolidation adversely impacts.220 Also inherent
in agriculture is a disparity in negotiating power from the very
beginning, even without consolidation.221 Farmers and ranchers
have excess capacity and little ability to control or reduce capacity
in the aggregate.222 A rancher cannot let his ranch go ungrazed,
and a farmer cannot ignore the need to farm their land for too
long.223 Yet, a food processor can allow plants to sit or run slowly
in order to manipulate the cost of produce.224 When processors
have significantly more capacity to manipulate the flow of product than producers, they hold almost complete market power.225
Antitrust enforcement over the past few decades has failed
to effectively consider these substantial structural imbalances as
well as the exploitative and exclusionary conduct present in input
and output markets producers face because of it.226

See id.
216 See id. at 71–73.
217 See id.
218 See id. at 67–68.
219 Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 359; see Bratspies, supra note 25, at
587–89; supra notes 172–81 and accompanying text.
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Beyond these analytical approaches, there is evidence that
simply taking a more aggressive approach in investigating matters may partially remedy issues stemming from consolidation, such
as depreciated prices for producers selling into consolidated sectors.227 One study tested this by informing large cattle buyers they
were under investigation for collaborating to depreciate prices.228
Using a repeated cross-section of prices across procurement auctions that were and were not subjected to the “investigation,”
the study found that prices in targeted auctions: “(i) significantly
increased as soon as targets were made aware they were under
investigation; (ii) remained higher as long as the investigation
was open; and (iii) systematically declined to the same low preknowledge state after the closure of the investigation without
prosecution.”229 While this shows how investigations can entice
parties to act fairly, it also proves that without a legitimate threat
of prosecution, violative parties will revert back to their bad practices as soon as possible.230
Another interesting factor that is beginning to play out is
how a changing executive branch may alter interpretation and
execution of antitrust laws.231 On January 20, 2021, Democrat
Joe Biden was inaugurated President of the United States, replacing Republican President Donald Trump.232 Biden’s policy
proposals include strengthening enforcement of antitrust laws in
order to allow producers “access to fair markets where they can
compete and get fair prices for their products.”233 Biden has also
nominated a number of advocates of strong antitrust enforcement
to prominent positions within the White House and regulatory
agencies.234 When the question of antitrust enforcement hinges

227 Kalyn Coatney & Jesse Tack, The Impacts of an Antitrust Investigation:
A Case Study in Agriculture, 44 R. INDUS. ORG. 423, 436–40 (2014).
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See The Biden-Harris Plan to Build Back Better In Rural America, JOE
BIDEN [hereinafter The Biden-Harris Plan], https://joebiden.com/rural-plan/
[https://perma.cc/LZX4-TZNR].
232 Peter Baker, Biden Inaugurated as the 46th President Amid a Cascade
of Crises, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/20/us
/politics/biden-president.html [https://perma.cc/62JT-39UH].
233 The Biden-Harris Plan, supra note 231.
234 Leah Nylen, Biden Picks 2 Antitrust Crusaders. But His Biggest Choices
Come Next, POLITICO (Mar. 9, 2021, 7:47 PM), https://www.politico.com/news
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on interpretations of law, simply changing who is doing the interpreting may be all that is needed to right the ship.235 However,
that raises the clear issue of what happens next time political seas
change.236 In order to ensure long-term relief from cartel abuse,
concrete administrative changes to interpretation and implementation must be applied.237
While the path to stronger enforcement may take multiple
routes, the overarching principle is straight forward: to ensure
fair competition in the agricultural marketplace, it is imperative
that federal regulators provide proper enforcement of antitrust
laws.238 Also clear is that the current approach employed by regulators does not fulfill the promise of the legislation they are entrusted
with enforcing, as evidenced by the widespread consolidation presented in Part II.239
However, there is not a universal consensus that increased
enforcement will remedy consolidation and there exists a fair
share of critiques that must be confronted.240
B. Critiques
The principal argument against increased antitrust law
enforcement is that it would harm consumers by decreasing economic efficiency and increasing prices.241 The argument goes that

/2021/03/09/biden-antitrust-tech-ftc-474875 [https://perma.cc/BC85-2U6Y];
Margaret Harding McGill, Strong Arm on Tech, AXIOS (May 1, 2021), https://www
.axios.com/biden-big-tech-critics-nominations-caee5dde-b1e9-4452-bf97-b6712
2f8e7f4.html [https://perma.cc/NS34-BHD2].
235 Alan Rappeport & Michael Corkery, Biden’s Choice of Vilsack for U.S.D.A.
Raises Fears for Small Farmers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/12/21/us/politics/vilsack-usda-small-farmers.html [https://perma
.cc/HPD3-5BN7]. However, Biden’s nominee for Secretary of Agriculture, Tom
Vilsack, previously served as USDA secretary under President Barack Obama,
an administration that was not able to implement the long-term changes necessary to grant relief from consolidation, creating concern in some agricultural
advocacy groups. Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 See Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 75; Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at
358–59; Bratspies, supra note 25, at 608.
239 See supra Part II; Kass, supra note 31.
240 See Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 75.
241 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 358–59; Coatney & Tack, supra
note 227, at 439; Bratspies, supra note 25, at 585–86.
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by allowing one company to control an entire sector, they can more
effectively bargain and create low prices and efficient markets.242
Basically, consolidation is actually good for the whole.243 However,
this thinking is seriously flawed and outflanked by the damaging
impact consolidation causes producers and consumers.244 As presented later, even while producers receive less for their goods,
consumers are paying more than ever.245 The anti-consumer effects
promoters of this defense warn of are already occurring under
their control, and it is hard to see how the scene could become
any more unfavorable for consumers.246 The current inefficient state
of play is one of depreciating prices for producers, while simultaneously rising prices for consumers, only benefitting those
claiming the current system is the most effective.247
These same companies also erroneously claim that consolidation serves the public by promoting food security and environmental sustainability.248 These claims similarly lack merit.249 In
reality, industrial agriculture stands as a cause of these problems,
not a solution.250 There is significant evidence that the industrialscale monoculture these companies represent drives climate change
rather than combats it and exists as an obstacle to food security
rather than as an ally.251 For example, the United Nations (UN)
Conference on Trade and Development expressed concern that “concentration in agricultural biotechnology is giving the largest corporations unprecedented power vis-à-vis growers and other
stakeholders” with “far-reaching implications for food security.”252

242 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 358–59; see also Bratspies, supra
note 25, at 585–86.
243 See Moss & Taylor, supra note 85, at 359–60.
244 See id.
245 Kelloway, supra note 21; see also supra Part IV.
246 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
247 See id.
248 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 585–86. For example, Bayer CEO Werner
Bauman characterized his company’s proposed merger with Monsanto as “the
kind of revolutionary approach to agriculture that will be necessary to sustainably feed the world.” Id. at 585. Similar sentiments are echoed throughout the
industry. See id. at 585–86.
249 See id.
250 Id. at 586.
251 Id.
252 Bratspies, supra note 25, at 586; U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Tracking the
Trend Towards Market Concentration: The Case of the Agricultural Input Industry, Apr. 20, 2006, at iv, 1, https://grain.org/en/article/2197-unctad-study-tracking
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The UN has also warned that advancements in technology and
environmental sustainability corporations claim to have made have
“had very limited impact so far.”253 In the case of pesticides for
example, some of the very products companies tout as solutions
are, in reality, undermining environmental efforts.254 Also, as presented, consolidation greatly weakens food chains.255 While corporations push a narrative that they are securing food systems and
fighting climate change by controlling whole markets, in reality
they are driving the continuation of these global threats.256
Overall, while critiques offered by the corporations controlling agricultural markets may make basic sense, they are undermined by reality.257 The evidence is clear: the current system
of regulatory oversight has allowed a handful of massive international corporations to control entire industries.258 As seen in
the next Section, this is having a detrimental impact on producers, consumers, rural America, and the entire economy.259
C. Other Solutions
In this analysis of how to combat consolidation plaguing
agriculture, it is helpful to briefly touch on additional potential
solutions.260 These additional proposals can be grouped into two
categories: statutory changes to strengthen trust regulation and
increasing bargaining power of producers through “free-market”
solutions such as strengthening co-operatives.261

-the-trend-towards-market-concentration-the-case-of-the-agricultural-input-in
dustry [https://perma.cc/959H-8JR3].
253 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 586; HUGH TURRAL ET AL., FOOD AND AGRIC.
ORG. OF THE U.N., CLIMATE CHANGE, WATER, AND FOOD SECURITY xxiii (2011).
254 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 586. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food cautioned that the model of agriculture these companies represent “is highly problematic, not only because of damage inflicted by pesticides,
but also their effects on climate change, loss of biodiversity and inability to
ensure food sovereignty.” Id.
255 Such as when COVID-19 shut down meat packers, which, due to few
alternatives, threatened the entire food chain. See supra notes 172–81 and
accompanying text.
256 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 586.
257 See id. at 585–87.
258 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 64.
259 See infra Part IV.
260 See infra Section III.C.1.
261 See Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 73–74.
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1. Statutory Action
To strengthen the foundation regulators use to patrol markets and reduce room for faulty interpretations, it would be helpful for Congress to pass amendments to current antitrust laws or
new laws altogether to specifically target the issues plaguing agriculture.262 The current antitrust statutes are for the most part
short pieces of legislation.263 This brevity leaves room for interpretations that can shift to reflect anticompetitive views.264 More
defined and clear statutory prescription could fill these gaps.265
One such proposal includes reinstating the Agricultural Adjustment Act,266 a law that contained important policy for agrarian
viability such as parity pricing, and price supports that cover producers’ costs of production in setting commodity prices.267 Reinstating this for agricultural goods would ensure consolidated
agribusinesses are not able to fix prices below certain costs of
production.268
Additional proposals include passing legislation requiring
regulatory agencies to take antitrust enforcement action in any sector where the four biggest firms control more than fifty percent
of market,269 as well as passing amendments to the PSA making
it easier for producers to file unfair practices claims and protections for reporters from retaliation.270 Furthermore, regulating
the use of production contracts and the ability of corporations to

See Kass, supra note 31.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, for example, is less than 100 words. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–38.
264 Andrea Agathoklis Murino & Brian N. Desmarais, Practice Note, Antitrust
Law Fundamentals, 2021 LEXIS, available at https://plus.lexis.com/api/perma
link/10e049ad-08dc-4aaa-80f9-fd6a3ed20875/?context=1530671.
265 Id.
266 See Kass, supra note 31. The policy lapsed in 1973 and has never returned
as part of federal agricultural law. Id.
267 See id.
268 See id.
269 See Kelloway, supra note 21. As has been presented, this would cover many
crucial agricultural industries. Id.
270 Id. In 2010, a number of small chicken producers who reported abuses
to the USDA during public forums were retaliated against by the large chicken
processing corporations they contracted with. Nathanial Haas, John Oliver vs.
chicken, POLITICO (June 1, 2015, 5:24 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015
/06/john-oliver-vs-chicken-118510 [https://perma.cc/C9PU-TT9L].
262
263
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leverage patent power to shore up market control would go a long
way toward fixing specific faults that both drive and result from
consolidation.271 There is also recently introduced legislation which
would increase funding to regulatory agencies, giving them greater
capacity to take on some of the largest companies the world has
ever known.272
These statutory changes could create a stronger toolbelt
from which regulators could more aggressively approach antitrust
enforcement.273 While helpful, it would still be necessary to bring
about the same changes of interpretations and analysis argued for
throughout this Note.274 Without that, any new legislation could
similarly be interpreted to allow large corporations to consolidate the market.275
2. Reform Agricultural Co-ops
A more “free market” solution may be to empower and encourage agricultural co-operatives (“co-ops”), comprised of small
producers, in order to shift bargaining power in their favor.276 By
forming co-ops, producers may be able to bargain more effectively
with monopolistic companies.277 The PSA and other antitrust

Riviere et al., supra note 114, at 18–19.
272 Bill Baer, How Senator Klobuchar’s Proposals Will Move the Antitrust
Debate Forward, BROOKINGS (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog
/techtank/2021/02/08/how-senator-klobuchars-proposals-will-move-the-antitrust
-debate-forward/ [https://perma.cc/LK9E-S6RY].
273 See Riviere et al., supra note 114, at 24. Enacting these changes may also
require a change in the composition of the legislative branch. Sandeep Vaheesan
& Nathan Schneider, Cooperative Enterprise as an Antimonopoly Strategy, 124
PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (Oct. 22, 2019). These policy proposals find bipartisan
support amongst the electorate. Id. Yet, for the most part, Democratic politicians
are leading the charge in Congress. Id. Democratic party leaders proposed “A
Better Deal” document in 2017 that called for “cracking down on corporate
monopolies.” Id. However, there are even some Republicans joining the choir, especially amongst the populist wing of the party. Id.; Kelloway, supra note 21.
274 See Baer, supra note 272.
275 Id.
276 See Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 83.
277 See id. at 80. However, over time some co-ops have become so big that
they themselves have become abusive monopolies. See Kelloway, supra note 21.
In the dairy industry, large co-ops such as the Dairy Farmers of America and
Land O’Lakes swallowed up rivals, made deals with large firms, and earned
record profits, all while their members suffered from record low prices and go
271
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legislation exempt co-ops from certain trust restrictions on coordination and price setting in order to incentivize their formation
and empower them to coordinate effectively.278 In contrast to the
dominant model of investor-owned business and its core ideal of
shareholder wealth maximization that exacerbates destructive
effects seen in the industry, co-ops can mitigate these effects by
focusing on advancing the interests of small producers, consumers, workers, and overall a much wider swath of the citizenry.279
While this may be an ideal solution, in the current climate it
appears impractical.280 Co-ops are hard to form and organize.281
More importantly though, the corporations currently controlling
the industry are so big and the market is so concentrated that it
may prove fruitless even if a very large co-op force could be
formed.282 In order for co-ops to gain a foothold, they need greater
enforcement to reduce current levels of consolidation.283 Once
accomplished, strong and effective co-ops may be an ideal solution to ensure producers maintain a consistently strong bargaining position.284
Each of these potential solutions has merit, however they
also have major flaws and still rely on support of regulatory agencies to fulfill their duties and enforce antitrust laws.285 To fully
ensure competition in the agricultural marketplace, it is imperative
that regulators provide proper enforcement.286 A lack of enforcement has resulted in increased consolidation and corporate agribusinesses holding a disproportionate share of market power in
nearly every sector.287 This has caused inexplicable harm to small

out of business by the thousands. Id. To fix this, Congress could pass laws ensuring the governance of co-ops remains in the hands of members, and that no co-op
becomes so big that it monopolizes local markets. Id.
278 See Vaheesan & Schneider, supra note 273, at 1–2; Moss & Taylor, supra
note 85, at 360.
279 See Vaheesan & Schneider, supra note 273, at 1–2; Moss & Taylor, supra
note 85, at 360; Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 83.
280 See Vaheesan & Schneider, supra note 273, at 21.
281 See id.
282 See id.
283 See id.
284 See id.
285 See Zimmerli, supra note 37, at 83.
286 See Kass, supra note 31.
287 See supra Part II; Kass, supra note 31.
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producers while delivering little to no benefit to consumers.288
Part IV of this Note will explore that damage and fully present
how consolidation in the agricultural industry is harming producers, consumers, both rural and urban communities, and as a
result, the entire economy.289
IV.IMPACT ON SMALL PRODUCERS
America’s farmers and ranchers are familiar with hardships
and the need to overcome them.290 Inclement weather, trade deals,
equipment failures, and many other problems routinely complicate agricultural production.291 Yet, trade deals come and go, good
and bad, same with the weather.292 A drought may be followed
by the perfect rain quantities or by a flood.293 There is a certain
amount of luck and uncertainty surrounding a producer’s way of
life, an accepted cost of business.294
However, one constant force which has impeded producers’ ability to maintain consistent profits and preserve their way
of life more than any other is the rampant market consolidation
presented throughout this Note.295 Part II presented the startling
consolidation that has grabbed control of nearly every sector of
the agricultural industry.296
Just as startling as this consolidation and the lack of enforcement that caused it is its devastating impact.297 This Part
will present that impact on producers, as well as on consumers
and rural economies as a whole.298 First, a look at the impact on
small producers.

See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 74.
289 Infra Part IV.
290 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
291 See Semuels, supra note 9.
292 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
293 See Len Calderone, Effects of Extreme Weather on Farming, AGRITECH
TOMORROW (Dec. 26, 2018, 5:32 AM), https://www.agritechtomorrow.com/arti
cle/2018/06/top-article-for-2018-effects-of-extreme-weather-on-farming/10806
[https://perma.cc/83RT-GLQH].
294 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
295 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 72.
296 Supra Part II.
297 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62.
298 Supra Part IV.
288
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A. Impact on Producers
High concentration does not just impact a few aspects of a
producer’s operation; due to the universal nature of consolidation,
the damage is equally universal.299 Initial costs, sale prices, and
everything in between, no aspect of a farmer or rancher’s operation
is left undamaged.300
Perhaps where this harm is most clearly seen is in increasing
costs, paired with stagnant prices producers sell their goods for.301
When competition is non-existent, leaving producers little choice
on where to buy and sell, this naturally leads to prices damaging
for their bottom lines.302
1. Input Costs
Before a producer gets anywhere near receiving a paycheck,
they must first pay startup expenses.303 Seeds, fertilizers, and
equipment are normally far from cheap investments.304 Yet today, producers are seeing their input costs rise even higher.305
When the giants controlling input markets face little pressure to
compete, increases in concentration of input sectors results in shocking increases in input costs.306 Many of these cost rises perfectly
mirror the rise in consolidation.307 Overall, American producers
are paying over three times more for inputs today than they did
in the 1990s,308 a result of higher costs for nearly everything they
need to grow their goods.309

See Kelloway, supra note 21; Bratspies, supra note 25, at 589–90; Domina
& Taylor, supra note 19, at 84–86.
300 Kelloway, supra note 21.
301 Bratspies, supra note 25, at 599–600.
302 Kelloway, supra note 21.
303 See MARY AHEARN & DORIS NEWTON, ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., ECONOMIC INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 53: BEGINNING FARMERS AND
RANCHERS 19 (2009).
304 See id.
305 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 599–600.
306 See id.
307 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 599–602; Domina & Taylor, supra note
19, at 62; supra Part II.
308 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
309 See id.
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Starting with seeds, no matter what crop a farmer is setting out to grow, they will face prices past generations could not
have imagined.310 For example, farmers planting soybeans or corn
in 2015 paid over 300% more for those seeds than they paid only
two decades earlier.311 For cotton seeds, farmers witnessed a 500%
increase over the same period.312 In recent years seed prices have
increased around thirty percent annually, significantly higher than
the rate of inflation.313 These increases mean that purchasing seeds
costs farmers over sixteen percent of their crop’s ultimate sale
price, twice the historic norm of four percent to eight percent.314
It is a similar story for fertilizers and pesticides, whose prices
roughly tripled from 1990 to today, with the steepest increases
coming after 2007.315 The fertilizer market is dominated by several international companies and in 2013 the American Antitrust Institute argued that price swings in these markets were
due almost entirely to oligopolistic behavior.316
This damage has mostly been as a result of decreased choice
due to increased consolidation.317 Aside from directly eliminating
competitors and local options, controlling corporations have implemented two other tactics to greatly limit choice and increase
costs.318 First, large amounts of research and development on the
part of these corporations has focused on creating “platforms” of
seeds and chemicals which, with the purchase of one product, contractually locks a producer into the entire platform of products.319

See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 599–601.
311 See id. at 589–90; Kelloway, supra note 21.
312 Philip H. Howard, How Corporations Control our Seeds, in BITE BACK:
PEOPLE TAKING ON CORPORATE FOOD AND WINNING 15 (2020).
313 Bratspies, supra note 25, at 600; Henry Bryant et al., Effects of Proposed
Mergers and Acquisitions Among Biotechnology Firms on Seed Prices, 1, 27
(Tex. A&M U. Agric. Food & Pol’y Ctr., Working Paper No. 16-2, 2016).
314 Bratspies, supra note 25, at 599.
315 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
316 Id.
317 See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 601–04.
318 See id. at 603.
319 Id. Some critics further argue these platforms are engineered for the
purpose of creating exclusive packages of traits, seeds, and agrichemicals that
are less likely to interoperate with rival products. Id. at 604. This bundling
practice may constitute illegal tying under § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of
the Clayton Act, however regulators have failed to investigate the practice.
Riviere et al., supra note 114, at 6.
310
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Companies also deploy a second tactic of using patent rights to
obtain market dominance.320 Under this system farmers do not
purchase seeds outright, but are instead offered the opportunity
to license seeds for a single growing season.321 Among the license
conditions are clauses barring seed saving and limiting warranties.322 Further, as discussed in Part II, changes in patent law
allowed corporations to flood the market with costly genetically
engineered seeds.323 While these seeds produce higher yields, that
has not translated into benefits for producers.324 These tactics have
been highly profitable for the companies deploying them, but those
profits come at the expense of greatly reduced choice.325 This
squeezes out competitors and creates enormous barriers to entry
for new companies,326 resulting in weaker restraints on price increases.327 Meanwhile, in markets without significant consolidation,
where smaller local companies retain market power, farmers have
more options and lower costs.328
The equipment sector is also witnessing similar effects.329
Tractors, combines, and other pieces of equipment are extraordinarily expensive investments, with newer models often costing
more than a house.330 While some of this rise can be attributed
to technological advances,331 an overall lack of competition is chiefly

See Bratspies, supra note 25, at 604–05.
Id.
322 See id.
323 Id. at 603–05; see supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
324 Frederico Ciliberto et al., Valuing Product Innovation: Genetically Engineered Varieties in US Corn and Soybeans, National Institute of Food and
Agriculture, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Working Paper, Paper No. 17-WP 576, 2017),
https://www.card.iastate.edu/products/publications/pdf/17wp576.pdf [https://
perma.cc/89RK-84MW].
325 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
326 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 455; Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 64.
327 See Lauck, supra note 35, at 455; Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 64.
328 Bratspies, supra note 25, at 601.
329 See Riviere et al., supra note 114, at 7–8.
330 See Kim Schmidt, What’s Driving Consolidation Among Farm Equipment
Dealers?, FARM EQUIP. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.farm-equipment.com/arti
cles/15963-whats-driving-consolidation-among-farm-equipment-dealers [https://
perma.cc/SKR5-WX95].
331 See Caleb Jacobs, Farmers Are Buying Up Old Tractors Because New
Ones Are Pointlessly Complicated and Expensive, DRIVE (Jan. 9, 2020), https://
www.thedrive.com/news/31761/enormous-costs-of-new-tractors-drive-demand
-of-40-year-old-equipment-to-all-time-highs [https://perma.cc/4SY2-JW2W].
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responsible.332 With only two corporations controlling a major share
of the industry, mirroring consolidation in other sectors, similarly
raises the costs of implements.333 Beyond initial cost, one of the
most damaging effects is how manufacturers build equipment so
producers are unable to repair them, forcing them to spend significant amounts of money having company dealers do necessary
repairs.334 As manufacturers pack more technology into today’s
tractors, they have also made it nearly impossible to repair that
equipment by locking computer systems behind firewalls only dealers can unlock, using proprietary tools in assembly, and limiting
the resale of spare parts.335 This has forced some producers to go
as far as paying top dollar for older equipment.336 Overall, consolidation has led to higher costs, while causing equipment owners
to be beholden to those same corporations for maintenance, which
are also much more costly than under prior circumstances.337
All in all, with only a handful of massive corporations controlling nearly every sector of input markets, costs for products
producers need to grow their goods have risen drastically.338 Concentration has turned farmers from equal negotiating parties, into
price takers with no ability to negotiate.339 This has led producers
to pay over three times more on inputs today than they did in
the 1990s.340
One could make the argument that, while input costs may
be up, advances in science and technology leading to higher yields
and larger markets would similarly translate to increased sale
prices and income.341 However, reality shows the opposite.342 The

See Schmidt, supra note 330.
See Kelloway, supra note 21.
334 See Jacobs, supra note 331. Transporting the equipment to a corporate
dealer can cost thousands of dollars alone. See id.
335 Id. This has spawned a movement for a specific legislative solution, commonly referred to as “right-to-repair,” intended to allow consumers the ability
to repair and modify their own implements. Id.
336 See id. Rationale being that, although it may break down sooner, at least
they will be able to fix that equipment on their own for much less than it would
cost to maintain new equipment. See id.
337 See Kelloway, supra note 21; Jacobs, supra note 331.
338 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 62; Bratspies, supra note 25, at 587.
339 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 71.
340 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
341 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 80.
342 See id. at 63.
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prices producers sell their goods for have stagnated, and in some
cases decreased, over the past few decades.343
2. Sale Prices
As shown throughout this Note, the most alarming statistic
evidencing the harms of consolidation is the dollar share producers
receive from the purchase of their produce.344 Today producers
receive less than 15 cents of every dollar a consumer spends on
their goods, a dramatic drop from where that number stood forty
years ago, about forty cents per dollar.345 After accounting for
input costs, that drops to around eight cents in profit.346 The
hefty remainder is held by the controlling agribusinesses and
retailers.347 Even as monopolization means farmers pay more in
inputs, it also means they receive less for their goods due to equal, if
not worse, consolidation existent on the output side.348 Elevators
where a farmer sells their grain, meat packers where ranchers sell
their cattle, and other points of sale are in the hands of a small
and shrinking number of corporations.349
While the costs producers pay for seeds have gone up, the
prices farmers receive for their crops have not kept pace, with
the cost of seeds more than doubling relative to the price of harvested crops.350 In 1973, the sale price for corn was $3.30 a bushel;351
today’s average price is around $3.10 a bushel.352 In the same
period, wheat prices have gone from around $4.00 a bushel to only
about $6.00 a bushel in some regions.353 At the nadir of the great

See id.
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345 See Domina & Taylor, supra note 19, at 64–65; Kelloway, supra note 21.
346 Fast Facts About Agriculture & Food, FARM BUREAU, https://www.fb.org
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depression, wheat prices fell to around $0.49 a bushel.354 Adjusted for inflation that is about $9.00 in today’s money,355 higher
than even the best prices today.356 In 1973, soybean prices topped
$11.00; today, they often sink below $10.00.357 The examples go
on and on.358 Nearly every crop is seeing the same trajectory in
prices, as consolidation and input costs rise, and sales prices drop
or stagnate.359
The scene is not much rosier for livestock.360 In 2016, mega
pork processor Smithfield bragged that its record profits were
due to fourteen-year lows in prices paid to ranchers along with
higher consumer prices for those same products.361 At the same
time, the Contract Poultry Growers Association claimed that its
chicken farmers have not seen a base pay increase for the past
twenty years.362 In beef, which is less integrated than poultry or
pork, one study estimated that meat packer control resulted in
an average decrease in price of around $69.00 per animal from
what would be realized in more open markets.363 Even when
retail meat prices spiked during the COVID-19 pandemic, prices
remained stagnant for producers with live cattle futures hitting
eighteen-year lows.364 In dairy, the prices farmers receive for
their produce has dropped over forty percent since only 2014.365
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Heavy concentration has led to depressed profits for livestock
producers, just as in the crop industry.366
All told, key commodity prices have plummeted by about
fifty percent since 2012 and producers today are receiving sale
prices more on par with those of the 1970s than what should be
expected of today.367 This begs the question: how does it work to
live and farm paying 2021 costs, while receiving 1970s prices?368
It does not work.369 This disparity in input and output prices is
depreciating incomes and accelerating debt.370
3. Profits & Debt
Increased costs and depreciated prices are not an anomaly
of this moment in time; they have been building for years, and that
adds up for producers.371 Year after year of higher costs and decreased income shrinks profits, putting more and more producers
in the red.372 The last five years have seen the sharpest decline in
farm incomes since the Great Depression.373 More than half of all
farm households lost more money than they made every year since
2013.374 This unsustainable system is driving producers into
debt and towards bankruptcy.375 Many observers are predicting
the industry is on the verge of a debt crisis more dangerous than
the 1980s farm crisis.376 The numbers seem to be proving this
prediction true; since 2007, farm and ranch debt has jumped by
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a third, levels last seen during that 1980s crisis.377 With farm debt
at an all-time high of $416 billion, farm loan delinquencies are
rising as well.378 The downturn is particularly devastating for
grain, dairy, and other operations that rely on large annual operating loans.379 After four to five years of losing money, these
farms have exhausted their credit lines.380 Farmers’ debt-toincome ratios are at the highest levels in three decades.381 Since
1980, around 17,000 cattle ranchers have gone out of business
while nearly seventy percent of hog farms and seventy-five percent of peanut farms have met the same fate.382 In 2020, the United
States lost a total of 4,400 agricultural operations,383 with Wisconsin alone losing over 1,100 dairy farms over the past two years.384
Small producers are going out of business and their operations
are being consolidated, forcing neighbors to buy out neighbors in
hopes of expanding and improving profits.385 Even though farms
have expanded in size significantly over the past century, controlling corporations have outpaced them,386 leaving most producers still too small to negotiate for fair terms or prices.387 This
is occurring while producers are more efficient than ever; operating more land, producing more goods, and supplying food to
more people, all while receiving less in their paychecks and being
driven into bankruptcy.388
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Perhaps the most frightening result of this economic toil
is its impact on the physical well-being of individual producers.389
Under immense pressure to preserve a struggling way of life
their families have known for generations, producers are feeling
pushed to their limits.390 Farming and ranching are not like other
jobs where if you lose it you go home and find another. For many
producers, the land they produce their goods on has been in
their families for generations, and the thought of losing that
sacred inheritance is too much for many to bear.391 This pressure
is buttressed by a severe lack of access to mental healthcare in
most rural areas.392 According to a study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, farmers are among the most likely
of any occupation to die by suicide,393 with producer suicide rates
increasing by forty percent in less than two decades.394 One dairy
co-op recently even sent its members a list of suicide hotlines
along with their paltry dairy checks.395
These heartbreaking numbers are perhaps the most jarring
results of the degradation of the agricultural way of life.396 However, not only is consolidation slowly destroying small agricultural operations,397 it is also harming consumers.398
B. Impact on Consumers
Monopolization in agriculture has become so extreme that
even as it drives down prices for producers, it drives up prices
for consumers.399 The spread between prices paid to farmers and
prices paid by consumers increases as concentration grows in
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both food processing and retail, even after adjusting for increased
processing of food.400 Increased concentration in the chain of buyers,
processors, and retailers has undoubtedly contributed to increased cost of food even if some processors and retailers claim
they are not making significant profits.401 This suggests increased
concentration not only results in higher prices, but also produces
economic inefficiency.
For example, chicken and turkey retail prices grew steadily
over the last decade, by nineteen and forty-seven percent, respectively, from 2007 to 2013, well beyond the inflation rate.402 The
same is seen for nearly every agricultural product, with a loaf of
bread sometimes costing consumers nearly as much as a producer receives for an entire bushel of grain, enough grain to create
over seventy loafs.403
This massive drop in producer profits, mixed with the increase in consumer costs, has resulted in the large agricultural
corporations that control the industry to be allowed to rake in
profits like never before.404
C. Impact on Corporations
There may be only one group benefiting from the current
layout of the agricultural industry: the corporations that hold vast
amounts of market share in nearly every sector.405 A growing share
of every dollar spent on produce is going straight into the coffers
of the powerful few,406 with many of these corporations reporting
record profits, even while producers and consumers struggle.407
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Seed and pesticide giant Corteva forecasts a major increase
in profits for 2021, with over $2.5 billion in profits.408 John Deere
broke their annual profits record only nine months into 2021.409
Before acquisition by Bayer and recent legal trouble, Monsanto
touted record seed sales and profits in 2017.410 Smithfield, Dairy
Farmers of America, and many more are also seeing record profits.411 The examples are plenty.412 The only group doing well, and
they are doing very well, are the giant corporations that have
wrestled control of the industry, with lack of regulation an accessory to this power grab.413
These corporations are experiencing a boom while producers
go broke and consumers are forced to pay more to put food on the
table.414 This consolidation of power and wealth is also weakening the communities many producers call home.415
D. Impact on Rural Communities
For many rural communities, agriculture is the lifeblood
of their economies and cultures, with one in five rural counties
depending on agriculture as their primary source of income.416
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Therefore, as farm incomes decline, so does the economic health
of whole regions.417 First, local equipment and supply dealers are
forced to close.418 Then, with the decline in economic activity and
eventual loss of population, so do local restaurants, banks, schools,
and hospitals.419 Most people in rural America are not farmers,
but in traditionally age-dependent regions, even non-farmers’
livelihoods depend, directly or indirectly, on farm income.420
Take for example the town of Turner, Montana.421 In the
first half of the twentieth century, it was a growing agricultural
hub served by its own railroad spur.422 There were two banks, three
automobile and farm machinery dealers, hotels, department stores,
a doctor, a pharmacy, and more.423 Yet today, Turner is a town
of only about sixty residents, a co-op grocery store, a post office,
and a small school building holding classes for its grade school
students.424 There are many Turners in rural America, towns that
were once places of economic growth and opportunity that have now
dropped in population and wealth.425 This is not to say that a rise
in agricultural consolidation was the sole cause of the degradation
of small towns like these, yet it was a leading cause of the agricultural decline that contributed mightily to their deterioration.426
Rural communities are also disproportionately oppressed
by consolidation in other industries, including healthcare, finance,
and transportation.427 If we are to begin the restoration of rural
America to the societal and economic role it once held, regulators
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must employ aggressive enforcement of the nation’s antitrust statutory regime in all industries, yet most importantly in agriculture.428
E. Other Impacts
Beyond what has been presented, there are additional impacts stemming from consolidation that are important to mention.429 Due to the market power and influence a few corporations
have acquired, other agricultural policies have also shifted singularly
towards what is best for these corporations.430 One example is
how trade deals have been formed with little consideration for
small producers.431 Deals such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), or its modern counterpart the United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), have been “nothing
but an unmitigated disaster” according to some producers.432 Flooding American markets with foreign beef, for example, damaged
cattle markets,433 while providing consumers with subpar beef and
no way of knowing where that beef originated.434
Increased consolidation has also been detrimental to the
fight against climate change.435 As farmers’ margins are cut, the
only way some can stay afloat is by making it up in volume.436 This
accounts for the emergence of confined animal feeding operations
(CAFOs), which consists of many animals crammed together in
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431 Id.; see Kristina Johnson & Samuel Fromartz, NAFTA’s ‘Broken Promises’: These Farmers Say They Got the Raw End of Trade Deal, NPR (Aug. 7,
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/08/07/541671747
/nafta-s-broken-promises-these-farmers-say-they-got-the-raw-end-of-trade-deal
[https://perma.cc/V6UG-95HQ].
432 Homegrown Stories: Gilles Stockton, supra note 127.
433 Johnson & Fromartz, supra note 431. 2020 was a record year for beef
imports. Mike Dandrea, Record Year of Cattle Imports in 2020, KX NEWS (Feb. 17,
2021, 5:19 PM), https://www.kxnet.com/news/agriculture/record-year-of-cat
tle-imports-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/23VX-D6L7].
434 Dandrea, supra note 433. One policy that helped consumers in that regard was Country of Origin Labeling (COOL), which mandated foreign raised
meat to be marked with the nation it was raised in. COOL was repealed in
2015. See Homegrown Stories: Gilles Stockton, supra note 127.
435 See Kelloway, supra note 21.
436 Id.
428

622 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:575
inhumane conditions.437 These are not only harmful to animals,
but pose threats to human health as some use nontherapeutic
antibiotics on animals crowded into confined spaces, producing
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.438 They further cause pollution from
large manure lagoons, detracting from quality of life across expanding sections of rural America.439 These “factory farms” also give
agriculture a bad name, starring in anti-meat consumption propaganda, when in reality they are the major minority when in livestock raising.440 This affects all consumers alike, rural and urban.441
Many of the people who pick food and cut meat are also
marginalized when giants control the industry.442 Overworked and
under paid,443 farm workers are routinely exposed to harmful
chemicals and unsafe work conditions, wreaking havoc on their
health and a critical part of the food chain.444
In the livestock sector, market control has also manifested
in the increased prevalence of “production contracts” between meat
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packers and farmers.445 Under these agreements, producers raise
animals owned by meat packers with their equipment and labor,
using supplies provided by the meat packer, then animals are
returned to the packer for sale.446 The contracts delineating the
terms of these agreements are written by the meat packers and
often skew in their favor, containing restrictive terms which force
producers to follow costly and burdensome mandates, only to see
a relatively small share of the profits.447 These deals take all bargaining power that remained in the hands of producers away,
letting corporations run the show to an even greater extent.448 This
relationship currently dominates the poultry industry, with over
ninety percent of chickens produced under contract.449 Pork production is following a similar trend, with the share of pigs produced
under contract rising from six percent to twenty-four percent
between 1994 to 2000.450 Cattle ranchers fear that this practice
could take over their industry as well, and production contracts
are seeing increased usage in some crop production.451 In industries that have such dense consolidation, producers are left with
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little choice but to sign onto these predator agreements, worsening consolidation and its effects.452
The poor state of agriculture is also proving to be a drain
on the federal government’s budget.453 Over the past few years
there has been a marked rise in stimulus payouts to agricultural
producers.454 While this fills the gap for some, it is often only
enough to get by for another year.455 In a time when the federal
deficit is continually rising, it may be more effective to restore
markets by enforcing antitrust laws, rather than continuing to
pay producers billions each year while controlling corporations
rake in record profits.456
Finally, even the national security of sovereign nations is
jeopardized by such high concentration in critical markets.457 This
is most clearly evidenced by the 2021 foreign origin cyber-attack
that forced the temporary shutdown of major meatpacking company, JBS.458 While only a single company was impacted by the
ransomware attack, when that single company is responsible for
twenty percent of the nation’s meatpacking market, a temporary
halt leads to widespread damage.459 While a brief disruption, due
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to the drastic lack of supply chain flexibility consolidation causes,
this attack immediately led to a dip in prices for producers, and
a spike in costs for customers.460 Not only does consolidation hurt
many individual parties, it also has an immediate threat to the
security of critical food supplies and increases the fragility of national defense.461
It has hopefully been made clear throughout this Section
that agricultural producers are in a bad spot, paying more for the
supplies they need, receiving less for the goods they sell, reducing
profits and leading to increased bankruptcies, and in the most
devastating of cases, suicide.462 At the same time, consumers are
seeing little benefit, paying more for goods while their markets
are increasingly flooded with produce made in either environmentally damaging ways or in foreign nations.463 Meanwhile, the
corporations that have wrestled complete control of nearly every
sector of the industry are experiencing record gains, fueling their
continued takeover.464 In the end, this is not only damaging the
people who grow agricultural goods, but the people who buy those
goods, the communities where they live, and the health, well-being,
and security of the entire nation.465
CONCLUSION
U.S. States Senator Jon Tester, the only working farmer in
the Senate,466 once stated “industrial agriculture takes the people
out of the equation.”467 This Note has certainly proven that point.
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Producers, consumers, farm workers, and people of urban and rural
communities alike have fallen victim to the current lopsided,
corporate-controlled American agricultural system, all for the
betterment of the massive agribusinesses controlling the industry.468 As presented in this Note, the consolidation these corporate giants have been permitted to create is the most immediate
threat to family agriculture and the people and communities that
rely on it.469 The preeminent cause of this consolidation is the lack
of enforcement of the nation’s antitrust laws, powered by lax interpretations and metrics implemented by federal regulators,
paving the way for large corporations to swallow up markets
unchallenged.470 In order to alleviate growing concentration and
its deadly effects, there must be a recommitment to aggressive
interpretations and enforcement of antitrust laws by regulatory
agencies.471 If not accomplished, the current state of agriculture,
where the big get bigger and everyone else gets poorer, will continue, directly harming producers, consumers, and the entire
American food system and economy.472
America’s farmers and ranchers have long served this nation by producing world class food that sustains and enriches
each of our lives; it is far past time that this nation support their
efforts by ensuring that the people who feed the world can once
again afford to feed their own families.
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